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ABSTRACT
THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE IMF 
M.Emin KASAPGİL
M.B.A. Thesis, Institute of Management Sciences 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Gökhan Çapoğlu 
January 1989, 61 pages.
In this study, requirements of the international monetary 
system and evolution of the IMF's role in the system are studied. 
The IMF's role changed over the past years by force of
circumstances, moved towards long term lending, and recently
involved in the negotiations of debt reschedulings with creditor 
banks. For this, it is criticised to have broken away from the
principles of the Bretton Woods conference where it was conceived. 
Recently, the IMF's role and functions become controversial·
particularly by hdgh-debt developing countries.
Keywords : international monetary system, IMF policies, external debt 
problem, and reschedulings.
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ÖZET
IMF'NİN DEĞİŞEN POLİTİKALARI 
M. EMİN KASAPGİL
Yüksek Lisans Tezi işletme Bilirrjler Enstitüsü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Y. Doç. Dr. Gökhan Çapoglu 
Ocak. 1989, 61 Sayfa
Bu çalrşma uluslararası para sisteminin özelliklerini ve IMF'nin bu 
sistemdeki rolünü araştırmaktadır. IMF, geliştirdiği orta ve uzun 
vadeli kredileriyle ve Üçüncü Dünya ülkelerinin dış borçlarının  
ertelenmesi görüşmelerindeki çalışmalarıyla Bretton Woods konferan­
sında düşünülen rolünden uzaklaşmış, ve bu ülkelere önerdiği 
programların başarısız  ve tutarsız olduğu iddia edilerek, rolü ve 
işlevleri daha çok t a r t ı ş ı l ı r  duruma gelmiştir.
Anahtar sözcükler : uluslararası para sistemi IMF, dış borç sorunu
ve borçların ertelenmesi
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L INTRODUCTION
Before the Second World War, the world econoniy experienced a severe 
crisis (Great Depression,1929). The experience of the 1930's, implicitly 
or explicitly, was the basis for the belief that an active stabilization 
policy was needed throughout the world to maintain stable economic 
performance.!
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was formed in 1944 as "the 
chief organization in charge of overseeing and monitoring the operation 
of a new monetary order" . 2 The. draft of the Articles of Agreement of 
the Fund, specifying the basic structure and rules of the new monetary 
regime was prepared at the Bretton Woods conference. At that time 
there was a strong body of opinion or rather the expectation that the
Fund should be a regular intermediary between surplus and deficit
countries, that the Fund resources should constitute the next line of 
defence, a fter their own reserves for the balance of payments. In this 
context, the IMF was originally charged with overseeing on exchange rate 
system that was characterized by fixed or rather "pegged" exchange
rates with adjustable parities but with fairly infrequent changes in the 
exchange rates. This fixed exchange rate system was different than the 
gold standard operated among major countries from 1880 to 1914.
In the Bretton Woods system the hey role of gold was connected to 
the convertibility of the US dollar into gold at a fixed price. It lasted 
until August 1971 when the United States announced that it would no
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longer freely convert dollars into gold as before. Representatives from 
the countries were again gathered in December 1971 at a meeting at the 
Smithsonian Institution in Washington: a new agreement was reached that 
central role of the gold was removed from the system.
The world financial system has been in the real floating exchange 
rate period since March 1973. But it is also argued that this system is 
not a true floating, nor is it a fixed rate but a "somewhat flexible 
exchange rate system" because central banks do sometimes interfere in 
the market to get their hands "dirty." The IMF whose major function by 
1970s was to protect the fixed exchange rate system, allowing the 
•devaluations only to the limit of one percent of the original rates,
succeeded to adopt well to the system of flexible exchange rates.
The major objectives of the Fund are today officially to (i) promote 
cooperation among countries on international monetary issues, (ii)
promote stability in exchange rates, (iii) provide temporary funds to 
member countries attempting to correct imbalances of international 
payments, (iv) promote free mobility of capital flows across member 
countries, and finally (v) promote free trade. In other words its 
supra-goal can be described as to encourage increased internationaliza­
tion of business.
Referring to the Articles of Agreement of the Fund, we see that
the IMF would adhere to the "primary objectives of economic policy" such 
as "the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real 
income and... the development of the productive resources of a ll 
members." But the IMF's role in this issue is found to be doubtful,
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especially by "the developing countries and its terms of conditionality 
for lendings to these countries are globally controversial Before 
running into any scepticism about the inevitable role of the Fund we will 
f irs t  highlight the requirements of the international monetary system 
such as international money, an adjustment system, a control mechanism 
for stability of the system ,and then financial facilities offered by the 
Fund ; second, examine the evolution of the IMF's policies to respond to 
the changing requirements for the stability of the system ; and third 
how far could it adhere to the above "primary objectives of economic 
policy."
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2. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM
The main characteristics of the international monetary system are 
(i) the international money used by individual countries for clearing 
residual balances with others and for holding reserves against 
contingencies and, for arranging values of their domestic currencies in 
the foreign exchange markets; (ii) a medium for institutional arrangements 
such as interrelated banking systems, money and foreign exchange markets 
so that international money can circulate within the system; (Hi) methods 
for dynamically arranging the distribution of international money among 
the countries by adjusting the deviations from the balance of payments 
of the countries; and (iv) any kind of control power to keep the system 
in the balance.
2.1 Requirements of the International Monetary System 
Int^ernatdonal Money
Gold was the only form of international money in the past. 
But it was relatively limited with respect to constantly growing 
world trade and its value was uns table. 3 Another form of interna­
tional money is convertible currencies : a national currency is a fiat  
money and only is convertible if it is accepted or confirmed by other 
countries. But this convertibility is not riskless because a ll currencies 
are not equals A more recent form of international money is the
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Special Drawing Eight (SDR). Although this created liability o£ the IMF 
has a limited money function and forms a small proportion in the 
aggregate of the international liquidity, its relative importance is much 
larger in the system.5
Institutional Arrangements
The institutions of international finance are the aggregation of 
national banking systems including the central banks, commercial banks 
and those specialized in overseas business; the spot and forward foreign 
exchange markets; and the international capital markets dealing with 
capital flows among countries. These institutions have been in 
continuous evolution, and their evolution was quite rapid especially 
after the Second World War; banking systems have ramified, foreign 
exchange markets have become more widespread, and Individual capital 
markets have been more integrated with the rest of the world. So, while 
balance_of_payments problems resulted, until a few decades ago, from the 
disturbances to the current account, particularly to the trade items and 
were adjusted by changes in the capital account, today they mostly 
result from the capital accounts imbalances due to the flows occasioned 
by interest rate differentials between the countries.^
That the capital flows from one country to another is much easier 
by wide range of liquid assets through electronic transfer media. All 
these developments have served capital to become more mobile. As will
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ba shown later in this study, capital -Flight due to this mobility has a 
considerable responsibility in the balance of payments problem of the 
developing countries.
Adjustment
Ad.justment procedui’e is the mechanism to restore equilibrium of the 
balance_of_payraents, which is in part automatic and in part a matter for 
conscious choice among alternative policies. Adjustment mechanism is an 
essential characteristic in the system, without which a ll international 
money would flow persistently to a few surplus countries and away from 
deficit countries. Under the floating exchange rate system, the 
adjustment process is simple; a disequilibrium alters the exchange rates 
and changes the relative prices of the export goods of the country. 
That is to say that, in either case, adjustment through changes in 
relative prices corrects the disequilibrium in the balance of payments if  
the Marshall-Lerner condition-appropriate elasticity conditions of demand 
and supply for tradables- is satisfied. The choices of a country facing 
a balance of payments deficit can be listed as follows:
i) if  the country is well endowed with foreign 
exchange reserves and the balance_of__payments d iffi­
culties seem likely to be transitory, then the 
disequilibrium can be le ft to correct itse lf decreasing 
the reserves;
page: 6
ii.) i£ ‘the disequilibrium is in "the current account, 
the country may seek adjustment by reducing its 
domestic price level relative to the price levels of its 
trading competitors (but at a certain cost of
unemployment); or
iii) the country may devalue its currency or let it  
depreciate as much as required in the floating system;
iv) if the disequilibrium is located in the capital 
account, adjustment may be sought by raising domestic 
interest rates relative to those abroad, providing that 
domestic financial market in the country is well 
developed and well integrated to the rest of the world;
v) if  the above measures cannot be satisfactorily  
manipulated by the monetary officials, the country may 
resort to direct controls on the current and/or capital 
account transactions.7
Although adjustment is an important requirement for the stability of 
the system, adjustment policies may conflict with domestic policies. 
Policies aimed at employment, stable prices, economic growth and social 
welfare are not usually compatible with the balance_of_payments policies. 
In the case of a deficit, policies acted against deficit lead 
in the long run to "domestic terras of trade deterioration" and to 
absolute decline in the purchasing power of domestic residents.8 For 
this reason, policy makers in the deficit countries are reluctant towards
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balance_of_payinents adjustment policies.
Balance_of_payments disequilibrium is two sided; w-hen some countries 
give balance_of_payments deficits, some others must give surpluses. But 
in the case of a surplus, the surplus country may be content to 
accumulate reserves, resisting the demands of deficit countries for  
corrective action. While the sanctions operating against a deficit 
country to adjust its deficit are pressing and forcing as in the case of 
LDCs, those against a surplus country are moral or persuasive as in the 
case of recent Japanese surpluses.
Balance _of_payments disequilibrium creates an allocation for
international money and hence creates instability in the international 
monetary system. So stability in that system is directly correlated 
with the harmonization of the balance of payments policies and with the 
presence and strength of the adjustment forces and policies within the 
system. This problem gives rise to the fourth fundamental characteris-. 
tic of the international monetary system: coordinating and directing
force by institutions at the center of the system.
Control o f the System
Control of the international monetary system is a political problem. 
The history of the international economic relations over the past 
century demonstrates that the control was maintained by a few most 
powerful leader countries governing the system. Gold standard period 
(1870-1914) was the system functioned explicitly under the control and
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with the cooperatijn  o£ the moat powerful countries. The period between 
the World Wars I and II was a period of non-control and even chaos from 
point of international financial cooperation and confidence. But the 
Bretton Woods system which was effective from 1945 to 1971 was a period 
of control . To this end, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), General 
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), World Bank (IBRD) were 
established as international monetary institutions. The present system 
imposes controls involving sanctions which are brought to bear against 
deficit countries except the US. Permitting the control of the system 
means some degree of surrender of national sovereignty for small 
countries. This is what makes the problem political; exchange rates and 
economic growth and even social welfare policies are supervised by 
external authorities. Contradictions and conflicts among the policies and 
methods of supervision by these international financial institutions make 
their operations controversial throughout the world. For instance, a 
voice from Chile comments :
"The Fund [the International Monetary Fund] does not seem to worry unduly about the extreme fluctuations that have 
taken place in the value of the dollar, which motivated, until very recently, a massive flight of capital from all over 
the world towards the US, with a number of additional economic disturbances in the other regions. Although the 
situation has turned around dramatically since mid-1985, it is still a valid assertion that the IMF does not interfere 
with US monetary and exchange policies, as it does with those of the Third World."’
Each o f these four requirements_Jnternational money, institutional 
arrangements, adjustment requirements and control mechanism participates
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in enabling' the international monetary system to function. But one 
feature is common to a ll the elements: if the condition of confidence is 
not universally met, these four elements are not sufficient to provide a 
workable system. Particularly, failure of the confidence in international 
financial institutions such as the IMF may imperil the whole system.
The IMF was conceived in the Bretton Woods conference which 
initialized the fixed exchange rate period. In this period, the
hiternational monetary system was organized around the IMF. When this 
period ended in 1971, the system evolved to adopt to the system of 
flexible exchange rates. In the following two sections, these periods 
are studied from point of the changing role of the IMF.
2.2 The Bretton Woods System
The Bretton Woods conference brought about mainly , f ir s t  the 
replacement of the gold standard by the dollar standard for improved 
international money, and second the two financial institutions, the IMF 
and IBRD for the control of the system. The principles of the new 
Bretton Woods monetary system can be listed as follows:
i) value of the dollar was pegged to gold at a rate of 
$35 an ounce and currencies of the members o f the IMF, except
the US, were valued in terms of US dollar. Besides this, the 
U.S.A. was committed to exchange to gold a ll the dollars of the 
other members' central banks at the fixed official rate;
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ii) values of _ -the aU the members' currencies could only 
float within the margin of one percent. Central banks o f the
' members would interfere in their own exchange markets in order 
to keep their rates within these limits. Dollar would be used 
in these interventions for being international money;
iii) the current accounts would be opened by the member 
countries, allowing free foreign trade; a ll currencies would be 
convertible, tariffs and subsidization to export removed, and;
iv) since the system was based on the fixed exchange 
rates, devaluations were considered to be the last resort for 
improving the balance of payments disequilibria of the deficit 
members.
The primary i’esponsibility hence role of the IMF was to assist  
these countries in resolving "temporary balance of payments problems." 
Through short term loans and economic policy recommendations the IMF 
would help these countries adjust the periods of balance of payments 
disequilibrium. Finally if these aids and the proposed policies of the 
IMF came out to be s t ill insufficient, the IMF would give the permission 
to these member countries to devaluate their currencies by 10 percent 
or more as required. But the conditionality sought for this was the 
existence of "structural disequilibrium." And also , as will be emphasized 
later in this study the IMF remained reluctant for such devaluations as 
if it had dedicated itse lf to the fixed exchange rate systera.io
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The Bratton Woods confex’ence, in short, made the dollar the world's 
key currency. The quantity of international liquidity was tied to the 
supply of dollar. For this reason, increase in the supply of 
international liquidity required the US balance of payments deficits. 
But, in the years just following the Second World War, the United States 
was running huge export surpluses, as much as $31.9 billion for the 
period 1946-1949. In this case, the credits in the current account 
should be o ffset by the debits in the capital account in the form of 
loans and grants made to the European countries under the Marshall Plan 
and other aid programs.n Financial meaning of these aids was that the
US was pumping to the system the required amount of international 
liquidity. During the 1950-65 period, the US s t ill maintained balance of 
trade surpluses but at the same time made larger amounts of foreign aid 
and capital investment abroad. That is to say that although the U.S. 
gave trade surpluses of $21.9 and $38.8 billion in the successive periods 
of 1950-57 and 1958-65 respectively, due to overfinancing the export 
surpluses it gave increasing balance of payments deficits a ll adjusted 
by the increased supply of dollars with no burden or cost to the United 
States. This caused large dollar balances to be accumulated in the rest 
o f the world while the US gold supply was decreasing. As shown in 
Figure 2.1, US gold reserves fe ll from a $25 billion in 1950 to $10 billion 
in 1970. During the same period, dollar claims against the US gold 
supply increased from around $5 billion to $70 billion.
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FIGURE 2.1 US RESERVE ASSETS & DOLLAR
LIBILITIES TO FOREIG-NERS, 1950-75
YEARS
□ US $ LIABILITIES 
Source ;  Pool  and Stamos (19 8 7 ), p,45
+ US G-OLD RESERVES
The Bretton Woods system was set up around the IMF whose major 
function was to provide its members with international money in case 
they are short of it. US dollar and gold were interchangeable as 
international money and stocks of both were held by the Fund as well as 
by its members. As fa r as the international liquidity is concerned, the 
IMF was not satisfactory in its major function to provide the member 
countries with the required international money. Because 75% of the
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IMF's fund was creatad as a paol of a ll membez’s' currencies, most of 
which were quite useless to adjust the balance_of_payments deficits of 
the members. For this reason the IMF was short of US dollars as 
international liquidity. Increases in members' quotas, with the General 
Agreements to Borrow of 1960 and with the Rio Agreement of 1967 to set 
up the SDR system and the flush o f petro_do liars and euro _do liars 
reduced the effect of "less of dollars and more of many national 
currencies" with the IMF.
As previously explained, exchange rates were to be kept fixed in the 
short terra and balance_of_payments dis equilibria should be met by 
reserve transfers, supplemented by drawing on the Fund. Although the 
IMF, in the long run, was going to permit the exchange rates to be 
freely devaluated (revaluated) when necessary to adjust the 
balance_of_payments deficits (surpluses), it disregarded this condition 
and strictly opposed frequent changes in the exchange rates of key 
currencies. But this le ft the system without any flexibility with 
respect to the exchange rates. Consequently, demand for the US dollars 
to adjust the balance_of „payments deficits of the member countries 
increased. This development was the underlying reason of the large US 
deficits and the so called "dollar glut", which accelerated the failure of 
the confidence in the system. The outburst of the world trade and 
increasing balance_of_payments imbalances, and the above mentioned 
developments brought the system to the inevitable breakdown.
Although the IMF was set up with - great expectations, its authority 
was limited at the beginning. During the period of Marshall Aid
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(1948-1952) it was thrust into the bachgi-ound, and organisations l-ilr·:^  the 
OEEC and the European Payments Union came to power. In its f irs t  
decade, the IMF opposed any attempt on the part of members to free
exchange rates, and demonstrated a strong American influence on its 
affairs. In the 1950s it returned to the center of the system but s t ill  
having the inability to lead in solving the financial problems of the
world. The IMF, until 1971, made its contributions to solving the
problems, but they were peripheral rather than centrales
2.3 Flexible Exchange System
Within a few years of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods, leading 
countries allowed their currencies' exchange rates to float, and some 
others pegged their rates either to a currency or to an appropriate 
basket of currencies. The new system brought about two things: (i) 
Special Drawing Right (SDR)_ a created liability of the IMF_ and
currencies of some Industi'ial countries replaced the gold and dollar for  
holding reserves and for intervention and; (ii) members of the IMF were 
permitted to control over their own exchange rates. The Board of 
Directors of the Fund approved two fundamental decisions in 1973 and 
1974. These decisions were titled as "Central Limits" and "Guidelines for 
the Management of Floating Exchange Rates" according to which, shortly, 
the members could control their currencies by 2.5 % above and below 
their central limits and moreover, providing that the Fund be informed, 
they could select the regime of "multiple exchange rates.
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Proposal for the Second Amendment was put into effect in April 
1978. This Second Amendment of the IMF clearly approved the flexible 
exchange rate system of controllable type in which the members would be 
free to select their own exchange rate policies. Members could make 
multilateral agreements for seeking compatible macro economic and 
monetary policies for stable exchange rate system. The categories of 
the exchange rate arrangements and number of countries Included in 
these categories as of September 30, 1986 are shown in Table 2.1.15
Table 2.1
Exchange Rate Arrangements 
Categories and number of countries
Pegged to Single Currency 
U.S. dollar 
French franc 
Other
Pegged to Currency Composite 
SDR 
Other
Flexibility Limited v is -a -v is  single currency 
Flexibility Limited v is -a -v is  group of currencies 
More Flexible 
Adjusted 
Managed floating 
Independently floating 
Total
50
41
5
8
46
31
14
5
10
31
6
20
20
150
Source ;  IMF, F l oa t ing  Exchange Rates  in Developing Count r ies  
Exper ience with Auct ion and Interbank Markets,  May 1987.
Jamaica Agreement brought about the increase in the Fund's quotas
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by 32.5 % of which 25 % was accepted to be payed in SDR and in other 
convertible currencies in lieu of gold. One of the major differences of 
this period from the Bretton Woods period was the demonetization of the 
gold. The IMF firs t  removed the requirement for 25 % of the quota to 
be payed in gold and then sold half of one_third o f its gold reserves in 
the market and gave back the other half to the members. By this 
revenue, the IMF established a fund to help improve the balance of 
payments deficits of poor countries with less than SDR 300 per capita.
The years 1970s were under the pressure of inflationary trend in 
the world economy. The world prices in the 1960s had increased by only 
1 %, but increased by 6-7 % between the years 1970-72 and by almost 90 
% between 1973-75, resulted to a greater extent from that petroleum 
prices increased more than 6 times in this period. In the 1970s, the IMF 
acted against this worldwide inflationary going with its financial and 
policy assistance to the applicant deficit countries and decided on " a 
uniform policy of deflationary adjustment_ instant currency devaluation, 
a balanced budget and a package of deflationary reductions in government 
outlays and consumption.''i6
From point of the effectiveness of the IMF and from point of 
viability of its role, the flexible e.xchange rate system strengthened the 
requirement for the international monetary system the control as that 
of the IMF. In this system, in order to achieve exchange rate stability 
it was necessary to achieve a common pattern of macro policies. 
Because, divergent macro policies, especially among the "target zone" 
countries would lead the system to drawbacks if  not to breakdown: when
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"these Goun"tries ixifle"te or defl^^be toge'thei·’, exchange i"’at,es will remain 
constant, in this case there is no problem, but when some inflate and 
others deflate, the exchange rates diverge to harm the stability of the 
system. In this context, the IMF's control role includes also the 
supervision of the harmonization of the macro policies of member 
countries.
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3. IMF'S FINANCIAL FACILITIES AND CONDITIONALITY
Article I(ii) of the Fund Articles of Agreement states that a purpose 
of the IMF is "to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of 
international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and 
maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to the 
development of the productive resources of a ll members.” It is further 
stated in the Article I(v) that another purpose of the Fund is to "give 
confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund 
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards , thus providing 
them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in balance of payments 
without resorting to measures disruptive of national or international 
prosperity." However evaluations of "maladjustments in the balance of 
payments” by the IMF evolved and conditionalities for lendings to the 
members changed in the course of the history of the IMF.!"^
.3.1 Balance of Payments Disequilibrium and Adjustment
Since the Bretton Woods conference, there have been changes in the 
IMF's concepts of balance of payments disequilibrium and the adjustment 
process. Before the 1970s there were tliree Idnds of situations 
recognized. The firs t  one was considered to be caused by a reversible 
loss of markets or reduction in the terms of trade. It was regarded to 
be temporary and required no change in policies and no adjustments.
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IMF's I’esources would supplement the country's own reserves. The 
country's reserve position would be restored when external conditions 
and terms of trade were improved. The second type of disequilibrium was 
a consequence of excess demand resulting from expansionary monetary and 
fisca l policies. In this case demand management was required by the 
Fund for drawings in the higher credit tranches. The third situation 
which was not originally defined in the Articles of Agreement was the 
"fundamental disequilibrium" that internal and external prices were so 
divergent that an adjustment of the country's par value or exchange 
rate was required. Although the firs t  type of disequilibrium required 
no conditionality, stand_by agreernents for the other two types of 
disequilibrium involved fiscal and macroeconomic monetary, and fiscal 
policies, with exchange rate adjustment in the case of fundamental 
dis equilibrium.
In each case of above situations, some financing might be called for, 
but it was to be temporary financing to bridge a gap until the balance 
of payments restored. So the Fund's resources would therefore revolve. 
Until 1970s the IMF was originally in the business of making temporary 
loans. It had a duty to make sure that those loans would indeed 
revolve, which required that it ensure that adjustment was taking place 
if the deficit was not inherently self-reversing. That was the purpose 
of the two types of conditionality.is
Low conditionality involves merely establishment that a country 
declares it has a "balance of payments need" and it is taking measures 
to resolve its deficit problem. In this case there are no official
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performance cri-tei’da for’ following the country's situation. But high 
conditionality involves the country's design of a specific set of 
measures to eliminate its deficit, and Fund agreement that the program 
will be adequate for that purpose, and the country's commitment to 
implement the program.
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the firs t  oil shock in
197.3 created a more uncertain and difficult international climate for 
many developing countries. It was accepted by the IMF that there were 
economies "characterized by slow growth and inherently weak balance of 
payments positions" which are not temporary. There were also economies 
"suffering serious payments imbalances relating to structural 
maladjustments in production and trade." In this context, the IMF 
identified new kinds of disequilibrium that call for both financial 
assistance over a longer term and additional policy instruments as will 
be listed below. Thus two main categories of problems were defined: "(1) 
Serious imbalance relating to structural maladjustments in production and 
trade and where cost and price distortions have been widespread, and (2) 
an economy characterized by slow growth and an inherently weak balance 
of payments position which prevents pursuit of an active development
policy. "19
Under the f irs t  categoi’y the disequilibrium was defined to be caused 
by "external shocks," which were best represented by the sudden rise in 
oil prices in 1973-74 and again in 1979-80. The second category of 
payments imbalance covered the typical slow-growing poor developing 
countries.
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Amid t,hs changing financial ays tern, the IMF has flexibly adopted its 
credit policies to the changing perceptions of financial needs of members 
and its role. Members' access to Fund credit has been greatly expanded 
in relations to quotas through both the liberalization of basic financing 
and the addition of special facilities of longer term.q. This evolution 
finally brought the IMF near to the traditional expertise of the World 
Bank (IBRD), with medium-term stabilisation programs which explicitly 
recognized the links between balance of payments adjustments and 
resource mobilization and between stabilization and production. More 
technically spealdng, the IMF added the "supply side adjustment policies" 
to its repertoire other than the cliche of "demand management."
.3.2 IMF's Financial Facilities and Conditionalities 
■$
The fund was created as a pool of currencies and gold subscribed by 
its members in proportion to their quotas as indicated before. The 
quota has four functions: it determines (1) members' subscription to the 
Fund, (2) voting rights of members, (3) their borrowing rights on the 
Fund, and (4) their share of any allocations of SDRs. Each member 
contributed a quarter of its quota in gold and the remainder in its 
national currency. In return for accepting that its currency might be 
drawn by another member, every member acquired the right to draw other 
currencies under certain circumstances. So "drawing" from the Fund 
involves a purchase of another country s currency mostly which are 
called hard currencies in exchange for its own currency, and a repurchase
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of its own currency by paying back the foreign currency. These 
transactions are borrowing from, and repayment to the Fund.
A member's quota used to constitute the ceiling on its permissible 
borrowing, which was divided into five equal tranches: the firs t  one is 
reserve tranche, which was originally called "gold tranche", the other four 
tranches are known as credit tranches as shown in Table 3.1. At the 
stage of reserve tranche, the member is merely withdrawing the 
liquidity it deposited with the Fund as part of its membership
I
subscription. The firs t  of the credit tranches has been available on 
easier terms than the other three higher credit tranches. Although this 
Credit Tranche Policy is the Fund's basic financial facility, since the 
1950s a variety o f additional facilities have been added, the cumulative 
effect of which has been to create the possibility of members' borrowing 
as much as over five times their quota. From the mid-1950s, low 
conditionality was applied to the firs t  credit tranche. Any member 
requesting a drawing in this stage was expected to make only reasonable 
efforts to overcome its balance of payments problems. But there are no 
criteria by the IMF to measure the effectiveness of these efforts, which 
is up to the borrower's discretion. Drawings from the higher credit 
tranches are subject to a high degree o f conditionality. They are 
provided in the form of a stand-by agreement  ^ this provides the member 
with assurance of a right to draw in a series of Installments over 
specified years. These installments are available subject to the 
observance o f conditions known as performance criteria. When or if  the 
member violated the conditions of the arrangements, it became ineligible
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to dx-aw fui-bhex' instaliments. It is also woi-th noting' that there is a 
shift in the Fund credits from low conditionality to high conditionality 
since the mid-1970s.
Table .3.1 Possible Tranche Drawings 
and Related Conditionality 
( % of quota )
T r a n s a c t i o n IMF Holdings  o f  
Members*:
Dome S t i c  
c u r r e n c y
R e s e r v e s R e s e r v e
p o s i t i o n
(RPF)
C on d i t i o n a l i t y
Deposit of quota 75 
Drawings
Reserve tranche 100 
Credit tranche 125
Credit tranche 150
Credit tranche 175
Credit tranche 200
25 25
none
Incr e as ingly  
s e v e r e
i n vo l v in g  p rogram  
a g r e e d  by the IMF
S o u r c e :  G.E.J. Dennis ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i na nc i a l  Flows (Graham & Trotman,
19 8 4 ) 2 0
Basic Financing
As stated above and shown in Table 3.1, drawings in the resex-ve 
tranche, which merely return to the member resources it has provided, 
are readily available without any condition. Further drawings are in the 
credit tranches and are normally subject to conditions. Although these 
credit tranche drawings are not "loans" officially, they are economically 
equivalent to loans and are generally for balance of payments support 
rather than . for development projects. When the Fund was established, 
there were controversies on what conditionality should be put on the
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Fund credits. A policy on conditions for their use was adopted in 1952. 
It was restated and elaborated most recently in a 1979 executive board 
decision. 21
Credit is extended under a stand-by arrangement, which assures a 
member that it may draw on the Fund up to a specified amount in a given 
period without further review of its policies, provided it has observed 
the conditions and other terms of the arrangement. These stand-by 
arrangements originally have allowed drawings during a one-year period, 
and members have been expected to automatically repay Fund credit 
within three to five years. But in the 1970s as stated, above, balance 
of payments problems were not "temporary" anymore; to adopt this, the 
1979 board decision on access to Fund credit stated that: " in helping 
members to devise adjustment programs, the Fund will pay due regard to 
the domestic social and political objectives, the economic priorities, and 
the circumstances of members, including the causes of their balance of 
payments problems...[and performance criteria] will normally be confined to 
(i) macroeconomic variables, and (ii) those necessary to implement specific 
provisions of the Articles [o f Agreement] or policies adopted under 
them." Other performance criteria may be adopted only "in exceptional
cases when ... essential for the effectiveness of the member's programs
-I
because of their macroeconomic irapact. 22
The original Articles of Agreement limited a member's drawings in any 
one year to 25 percent of its quota unless the Fund granted a waiver. 
But no waiver was granted until 1953. However in the first  years, most 
of the drawings were unconditional (during the first  five years of
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opei-ations, only 32 percent o£ a ll drawings fe ll in the firs t  credit 
tranche with low conditionality). After the mid-1950s, waivers became 
more common because balance of payments could not be restored in short 
periods as before. And finally the annual limit on drawings was 
eliminated by the Second Amendment.
Special Facilities
The IMF originally provided only temporary balance of payments 
finance, distinct from other capital account transactions (which were 
mostly under the responsibility of the World Bank). Over the years, as 
stated above, financial requirements for the stability of the system 
changed and the interpretations of the IMF's beginning principles 
(Articles of Agreement and issues at the Bretton Woods Conference) were 
interpreted to allow the establishment of policies or facilities to meet 
special balance of payments problems associated with the different needs 
of particular classes of members and also to permit lengthening the 
period of continuous use of IMF financial resources and providing 
explicit subsidies for poor countries. It is these special facilities 
that “edged the Fund more directly into the realm of traditional World 
Bank expertise."2 3
Compensatory Financing' Facility (CFF) was firs t  created in 1963, 
principally to assist primary producing countries, particularly in 
providing " financing to members suffering an export shortfall of a 
short-term character... largely attributable to circumstances beyond the 
control of the member." It was later modified to expand access and to
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requii’e for large drawing's in relation to quota that the Fund be 
satisfied that the meraber is just on the way to correct its balance of 
payments deficits. Guidelines approved by the executive board in 1983 
interpret the requirement of cooperation with the Fund for an upper 
credit tranche drawing under the compensatory financing facility as 
equivalent to meeting the usual conditionality standards for an upper 
credit tranche program.
Buffer Stock Financing Facility (BSFF) was established in 1969 for 
satisfying the demands of the developing countries that the Fund payed 
greater heed to the problem of stabilisation of prices of primary 
products. Lihe the Compensatory Financing Facility, the Buffer Stock 
Financing Facility required only such conditionality as cooperating with 
the Fund in finding appropriate solutions to any payments problems.
Oil Facility and Subsidy was firs t  established in 1974, responding to 
sharp increase in oil prices. For the 1974 facility, the conditionality 
was minimal but when it was modified in 1975, drawers were required to 
describe their medium-term policies to deal with their balance of 
payments problems and to make economy on oil consumption or to develop 
alternative energy sources. This facility is also important from point 
of view that it was used by industrial countries as well as developing 
countries.
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) happened to be a milestone in the 
evolution of Fund policies· when it was established in 1974, it was 
obvious that some countries needed longer time to solve their serious 
balance o f payments problems because of structural maladjustments in
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pi’CiductiDn and tz-ada. Foi’ t,his z’aason Extended Fund Facility was 
introduced with the intention of providing longer term finance to support 
three-year programs involving structural adjustments. The programs 
involve drawings in, installments and performance criteria. Loans from 
this facility have a maximum terra of ten years, as against the five-year 
maximum that applies to the other facilities.
Supplementary Financing Facility (SFF) was established in 1977 and 
became operational in 1979. It was intended to provide resources in 
much larger amounts and larger periods than are available under the 
Credit Tranche Policy or Extended Fund Facility to members with serious 
balance of payments problems that are large in relation to their quotas. 
Commitments are no longer made under this facility since it was replaced 
in 1981 by the Enlarged Access Policy which serves the same purpose, 
allowing stand-by arrangements to be extended beyond the higher credit 
tranches, or extended arrangements to be enlarged beyond the regular 
limits, on the basis of resources borrowed by the Fund under bilateral 
arrangements. These resources carry a higher interest rate than the 
Fund's regular facilities.
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) was established in 1986, which 
marks a significant new phase in the World Bank-Fund collaboration. 
Being the most recent facility of the Fund, the SAF would be available 
to low-income countries which face protracted balance of payments 
problems and are currently eligible for IDA resources. To gain access 
to the SAF, a member must develop a "policy framework describing the 
member's medium-term objectives and the main outlines of the policies to
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be followed in pursuing' these objectives".2 4 "The policy framework would 
be developed jointly with the staffs of the Fund and World Bank, and 
would describe the "general outlines" of a three-year adjustment program 
including structural measures, and delineate in broad terras the expected 
path of macroeconomic policies.
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility , (ESAF) was established in 
December 1987. Tins facility expands the concessional resources 
available to low-income developing countries with strong adjustment 
programs. The objectives, eligibility, and basic program features are 
parallel those of the SAF, but the two facilities differ with respect to 
the provisions governing access, conditionality, monitoring, and funding.
Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF) was established 
in August 1988. This most recent facility combines assistance to 
compensate members against exports shortfalls and excesses in cereal 
imports cos ts . 2 4
Of the special facilities of the IMF, the Compensatory Financing 
Facility, the Buffer Stock and Oil facilities, and CCFF are applied with 
low conditionality. But high conditionality is applied to the EFF, SFF, 
SAF and ESAF-2 5,2 6 On the other side, SAF and ESAF also require the 
consultative cross conditionality by the World Bank
.3.3 Use of Fund Credit
The chronology of the IMF's financial facilities shows the evolution 
that it has flexibly adopted its credit policies to changing perceptions
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o£ financial needs and its role. By establishing the Extended Fund 
Facility in 1974, the IMF conceded that the balance of payments deficits 
of developing countries were less amenable to quick correction than
previously had been considered. But however, this facility has been 
used less frequently than might have been expected: during the first· ten 
years a fter it was established, there were outstanding twenty-nine 
stand-by arrangements and only .four extended arrangements. At this 
point, there were criticisms to the IMF that special facilities were 
unnecessary because the needs could have been met by a flexible
application of policies governing access to the Fund's regular
financing. 2 7
Member countries obtain economic resources as IMF credit, as
explained earlier, providing loans to be returned to the Fund within 
three to five years or in some cases, ten years. The IMF charges are 
lower than market interest rates, but since 1970s the IMF became much 
more a lender of last resort because of its lendings subject to
conditionality. As pointed out in Section 2.1, adjustment policies or 
policies for restoring external balance were recognized to conflict with 
domestic policies countries would like to pursue for their domestic
economies. IMF's demand management requirement such as tight fiscal
and monetary policies as conditionality for lending to LDCs were not
easily accepted by the elected policy makers of these countries. But
IMF's duty was to make sure that those loans would revolve, requiring 
that it ensure that adjustment should take place to restore the 
external balance. Since the balance of payments problems reflected
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mostly from raacrueconomic pz’obleras such as poor resource mobilisation, 
stability and production, the IMF shifted from short-term financial 
assistance to medium term stabilization programs, with longer return 
periods for credits, and hence higher risks for the IMF. The record of 
the use of IMF credits in years clearly shows the shift from low 
conditionality to high conditionality. Figure 3.1 depicts the situation 
that high conditionality credits were negligible in the mid-1970s as 
compared to the low conditionality credits fully reversed in the 
mid-19 8 0 s . 2 8
The Fund's stereotyped image in the LDCs became easily that of an 
ordinary creditor which inflexibly insisted on demand management which is 
a tough decision for elected governments in these countries. In this 
context, countries with access to the international capital market in 
normal circumstances were reluctant to apply to the IMF for financing 
their payments deficits. Only when they exhausted their creditworthiness 
they turned to the IMF, to get a "seal of approval' of their 
creditworthiness as well as to finance their deficits. For these
countries such as Britain, Italy, Peru and Portugal, IMF's high
conditionality credits were means to restore their creditworthiness in 
the international market.2 3 This development might have given rise to 
the most recent role of the Fund_ organizatör role in the debt 
negotiations, which will be studied in the next section.
There is also a second group of countries which are permanent 
clientele of the Fund from the poor LDCs. Because these countries have 
no alternative financial sources for not being creditworthy, they s t ill
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need the Fund whatever the conditionality is. But they have "an 
interest in the retention and extension of the low conditionality 
facilities so as to provide them with access to low-conditionality credit 
whenever a payments deterioration is due to circumstances beyond their 
own controL"3 0
Developing countries have used Fund credit to a much greater extent 
than industrial countries in absolute amounts and especially in relation 
to their quotas. From 1947 through mid-1980s, the cumulative use of 
Fund credit by non-oil developing countries equaled 232 percent of their 
quotas whereas that by industrial countries 28 percent. In absolute 
amounts, almost 76 percent of the Fund credit was used by non-oil & 
non-Indus tr ia l countries, of which almost 65 percent was obtained 
through the above mentioned special facilities.31
There was also a significant change in the distribution of use of 
Fund credit among groups of members: until 1973,- drawings by industrial 
countries accounted for 54 percent of total Fund credit, but in the 
period 1974-1984, the share of industrial countries fe ll to 14 percent. 
So the flexible exchange rate system made the industrial countries less 
dependent upon IMF resources. In recent years the IMF has turned out 
to be a creditor to the LDCs because no industrial country made an 
ordinary credit drawing from the Fund since 1977.
With the establishment of the SAF and later ESAF the IMF was 
appeared to be rather a lender to the poorest countries_mostly African 
countries. SAF was designed as a debt-relief facility to "allow the 
poorest countries to borrow more cheaply and over a longer period than
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is prissible "thi’Ciugh the IMF''s other forms of assistance. China and India 
volunteered not to draw on it, so most of the resources are available 
for Africa. "3 2
The combination of the special facilities provided by the Fund and 
the continuation of the requirement for external financial aid by most of 
the countries due to severe economic problems encountered resulted in 
prolong'&d use o f IMF ci'edit by these member countries. Records show 
that twenty-four member countries made use of Fund credits for periods 
of at least eleven continuous years, during the tree decades ended in 
mid-1 9 8 0 s.3 3 Herein there is one certain point that the cases of 
prolonged continuous use of IMF credit can not be accounted for the 
success of the Fund's facilities, but can be attributable to unforeseen 
adverse external conditions or policy failures by the Fund. On the 
other side, only ten of these twenty-four countries were granted 
credits under the extended Fund Facility, which normally allows a period 
of repayment up to ten years.
When records of use of Fund credits are examined, many LDCs are 
found to be dependent on IMF credits for a long time. But "the total of 
credit outstanding began to fa ll a fter 1985 and the IMF has become a 
net recipient of capital from the developing countries. For this it is 
much criticized."3 4 However, this situation may be only temporary as it 
was in the period of 1977 to 1980; then, as shown in Figure 3.2, the IMF 
was able to increase again its credits to LDCs. But the recent 
situation is much different as was written by The Economist on September
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24, 1988: "...'the debt troubles rumble on, and the Fund has become
increasingly compromised by them. The revolving short-term nature of 
its various credit facilities made it impossible to sustain the initial 
burst of new lending a fter 1982."
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FIG-URE 3.1 USE of IMF CREDIT
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FIG-URE 3.2 USE OF IMF RESOURCE
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4. CHANGING POLICIES AND NEW ROLES OF THE IMF
Over the 45 years since the Bretton Woods conference, there have
1
been important and outstanding changes In the Fund's concepts of balance 
of payments disequilibrium and the adjustment policies. The establish­
ment of the Extended Fund Facility by the IMF in 1974 involved it in a 
kind of lending that had previously been considered the primary 
responsibility of the World Bank What was new in the approach of the 
IMF in establishing the extended facility was the emphasis for supply in 
place of demand management.
The early years of the 1980s witnessed the rising of the external 
debt crisis: in 1982-83 the situation became Increasingly severe owing to 
the worldwide recession, high real interest rates and insufficient 
control in the system for the previous lendings by private financial 
institutions. As a result, the IMF voluntarily played important role in 
the negotiations with creditors for rescheduling the debts of the debtor 
countries.
4.1 From Short Term Financing to Medium Term Structural Adjustments
The failure of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and 
the oil shock in 1973 unexpectedly created a more' uncertain and difficult 
international climate fo r the monetary system. It was recognised by the
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Fund that there were economies "characterised by slow growth " and 
"suffering serious payments imbalances relating to structural 
maladjustments in production and trade."3 5
Medium-term Lending
In creating the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), the IMF moved toward 
the longer term lending of the World Bank and agreed to lengthen the 
repayment schedule under this facility, from the usual three to five 
years to a period of up to ten years. The linkage between balance of 
payments adjustment and resource mobilisation, and between stabilization 
and production required for a medium-term stabilization program, and 
hence edged the Fund more directly into the realm of traditional World 
Bank expertise.
However the Fund was disappointed in the early EFF programs which 
were too difficult to design as multi-year programs in the mid o f great 
international variability. This facility has been used less frequently 
than had been previously expected: during the firs t  ten years a fter it 
was established, there were only four extended arrangements out of 
thirty-three outstanding arrangements. Critics contended that " EFF 
programs had only superficial!;^’' addressed supply-side Issues and that 
Fund s ta ff  had impatiently expected quick results."3 6 Before allowing 
the EFF to fa ll into disuse the Fund preferred a succession of one-year 
stand-by. arrangements to reduce the uncertainty. Nevertheless, the 
emphasis on resource mobilization and utilization remained with even
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greater vigor in the supply side measures. In the early years, the Fund 
was supposed to be concentrated on financial variables and the 
management of aggregate demand, leaving macroeconomic "real“ variables 
to the World Bank But adopting supply policies, the Fund s ta ff showed 
that demand-side and supply-side policies were closely interrelated, and 
might claim that the new approach would put itse lf closer to achieving 
"the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real 
income [and] the development of the productive resources of a ll members 
as primary objectives of economic policy"(Article I).
Supply-side Adjustment Policies
In establishing the- Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in 1974 to provide 
members with more time and money , the IMF payed “particular attention 
to the policy measures that the member intends to implement in order to 
mobilize resources and improve the utilization of them." The new 
approach of the IMF to balance of payments disequilibrium embodied in 
the EFF is the emphasis on policies designed to deal with supply as 
contrasted with those relating to demand management, because the IMF 
recognized that the aggravating international environment would make it 
harder to correct the payments imbalances of these countries, only 
depending upon demand management.
Although balance of payments adjustment must begin with controlling 
the growth of the real demand within available supply before being able 
to increase it, policies were aimed also to promote both output
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expansion and switching of output from non-tradable goods to tradable 
goods. The IMF's demand management was previously required to "assure 
that higher output is not preempted by consumers and government 
expenditures not related to productive investment."3 7 But, on the other 
side supply-side terms has appeared more often in Fund statements in 
recent years. Presumably, discussions of extended arrangements with 
supply-side measures have devoted attention to structural changes under 
the concept of liberalisation to influence exports, import-s, and import 
substitution. For this reason supply side actions involved "microeconom­
ic policies such as the elimination of internal price distortions as well 
as distortions between internal and external prices; the liberalization of 
trade; the removal o f financial repression in the form of control on 
interest rates and capital markets; and the elimination of constraints on 
domestic and foreign investment."38
Relations with the World Bank
Not only the Fund but also the World Bank responde'd to changing 
global economic conditions: in 1980 the Bank initiated the Structural
Adjustment Lending (SAL), which was "designed to suppoi^t major changes in 
policies and institutions of developing countries that would reduce their 
current-account deficits to more manageable proportions in the 
medium-term while maintaining their maximum feasible development 
effort. "3 3 So the Introduction of this by the World Bank and the 
establishment of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and later Structural
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Adjustment Facility (SAF) by the IMF stressed the need for close 
collaboration between the World Bank and IMF. As previously stated the 
policy framework of the SAF would be developed jointly with the staffs  
of the Fund and World Bank, and would describé the "general outlines" of 
a three-year adjustment program including structural measures, and 
delineate in broad terms the expected path of macroeconomic policies. 
Besides this, with the EFF and SAL , the Fund and World Bank both were 
already providing balance of payments loans, tranched over one to three 
years, with medium-term amortisation periods. Both programs supported 
macroeconomic and microeconomic adjustments, and improving both external 
and internal accounts of the countries.
The increased interrelatedness of economic variables brought about 
the requirement for the need to construct programs that are consistent
t
across variables, which require collaboration between the staffs of the
two institutions. Tills last development caused a close linkage between
World Bank structural and sector loans and Fund stand-by arrangements,
which is the obvious' somewhat "cross-conditionality".4o Because these
current programs share the objective of adjustment with growth, and
have greatly Increased the degree of overlap between the two
institutions. Consequently, the IMF has become aware of the need to
construct programs that are consistent across variables and that
reconcile short-term and long-term targets i f  clearly determined. By
«
this, the IMF has sought to avoid the appearance of "inconsistent" 
behavior with the World Bank in its recommendations as a part of 
conditionality for lendings, but actually both the Institutions could not
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escape from being criticized to be inconsistent in their relations with 
the LDCs. The IMF's "close liaison” with the World Bank, involved with 
the SAF was worried, for example as stated by The Economist of 
September 26, 1987 : “ [this liaison] would further blur the line that 
once separated the two multilateral institutions: the IMF as a
short-term provider of liquidity on one side, and the World Bank as a 
lender for medium-term development on the other.
4.2 New Organizator Role in the International Debt
Under the adverse external conditions of 1970s foreign debt of the 
Third World increased from $100 billion in 1973 to over $400 billion in 
1977 and exceeded $600 billion in 1979. The so called debt swamps were 
so enlarged that they reached 800 billion in 1983 and $1 t r illion in 
1986.4 1 The IMF's policy has been always dictated in part by the size 
of its resources which was inadequate to meet the total amount of a ll 
requested , by members. Although the IMF adopted policies in 1977 4 2 and 
1981 4 3 under which, with the aid of borrowing, provided larger amounts 
of financing in absolute amounts and especially in proportion to quotas, 
however it  remained true that member countries had s t ill to negotiate 
additional financing from other sources. As will be discussed later, huge 
deposits in various OECD financial institutions such as commercial banks 
due to the surpluses generated in oil exporting countries by oil price 
increases were directed imprudently to finance imports of the developing 
countries from the industrialized countries. It may also be noted that
page: 4 2
large scale external borrowing from the private international financial 
markets at that time enabled member countries escaping from the Fund's 
conditionality to postpone resolution of their payments imbalances for a 
short period, and these countries approached the IMF only a fter they 
were faced with default. In this connection, the IMF recognized that 
unless it could provide larger amounts of financing to help meet the 
greater deficits in members' balances of payments, "members would be 
unwilling to accept the standards of the IMF's conditionality’’^  4 The 
adverse external conditions were aggravated for the borrower countries 
in the late 1970s due to the variable exchange rates -of commercial 
banks.
In the second half of 1970s balance of payments deficits were larger 
than ever; so IMF's financing gap was s t ill to be filled by commercial 
banks. The IMF commented that the maintenance of capital inflow was 
beneficial and would continue to be beneficial when balance of payments 
problems were resolved. The Managing Director of the IMF of the time 
urged that " the banks should act with a similar sense of responsibility 
[!]."4 5 By this, banks were going beyond their function of financing 
trade and specific projects to finance the balance of payments of 
countries, and were therefore performing the same sort of function as 
the IMF. Consequently, being cautious or not, every prominent 
international official at that time made proposals for an expanded and 
formalized collaboration between the IMF and commercial banks. Actually
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all countries in need of balance of payments financing began to 
negotiate loans by banks even on unfavorable terms such as variable 
interest rates.
Defaulting· Debt-servicing
The adverse external conditions were aggravated for the borrower 
countries in 1970s due to the variable exchange rates of commercial 
banks: in order to diminish the risks of lending under increasing 
uncertainty, the international private banks changed terms and conditions 
of the loans, shifting from the fixed exchange rates of interest that 
prevailed until then, to variable rates. What at the beginning appeared 
as a mere, technical innovation came to be a real trap, since any 
increase in the interest rate would apply to the total outstanding debt 
and not only to the new loans. Whereas the average rate for debts 
contracted at fixed rates (mostly concessional), went up from 4.4 to
about 8 percent between 1972-73 and 1982 (OECD data), the average rate 
for loans with floating rates (mainly "non-concessional") augmented from
8.3 to 17.5 percent during that period‘s ^  The absolute differential 
percentage was 3.6 points in the fixed interest rates but more than 9 
points in the variable interest rates. This- differential can be 
accounted for the success of the marketing techniques employed by
banks, but it can certainly be concluded that greedy banks and
Imprudence o f the short-sighted managements of the borrowing countriss 
gave the grave harm to the entire financial system which would su ffer
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for this in the future.
In the late 1970s debtor countries fe ll into debt-servicing 
difficulties.4 7 When debtor countries' defaults for debt-servicing became 
more common, two broad types of debt difficulty were distinguished by 
economists and bankers: the firs t  one is related to the liquidity 
problem of the debtor country, defined as a temporary shortage of 
foreign exchange resources; the second one is related to the solvency 
problems, where the debt-servicing obligations are beyond the 
longer-term economic capacity of the debtor country. The debt problem 
of the Third World in the late 1970s and in the early years of 1980s 
resulted from the solvency rather than liquidity scarcity in the debtor 
countries.
Countries which had debt-servicing problems found it necessary to 
negotiate with banks to reschedule their debts. Initially, rescheduling 
was regarded as a remedy to acute liquidity problems and usually dealt 
with debt-service of only a one-year period. Lately, it seems to have 
come 'to  be accepted as common means of dealing with actual 
interruptions of no,rmal debt-servicing, and in 'some cases, commercial 
banks were willing to conclude even longer-term arrangements.
Coimoerclal Bank Debt Rescheduling
The incidence of debt defaults and reschedulings until 1981 were, as 
already discussed low. From 1956 to 1973, ten LDCs^® _renegotiated 
debts o f around $7 billion in 24 cases o f rescheduling and from 1974 to
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1979, ten LDCs renegotiated debts of about $10 billion in 16 cases of 
rescheduling. 4 9 Reschedulings bursted after 1980 and became big
business and worldwide political problem: in 1980, six LDCs renegotiated 
$4.5 billion of debts; in 1981, fourteen LDCs renegotiated debts of nearly 
$11 billion, and in 1982-83, over thirty LDCs were involved in the debt 
rescheduling over $100 billion of external debt.5 0
The problem eased somewhat in 1984 as the gross domestic product 
and exports of developing countries increased and debt rescheduling 
agreements became effective. However the external liabilities of 
developing countries continued to Increase after 1984 but at a slower 
rate than in preceding years (and apparently at a  ^slower rate than 
exports). Well over half of the long-term debt exceeding $1 trillion was 
owed by twelve major borrowers (Argentina, Braail, Chile, Egypt, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Turkey, Veneauela and Yugoslavia).51
Risks for defaults were not only to the financial standing of 
individual banks but, through a possible collapse of confidence and a 
chain of reaction of bank failures stopped only by substantial central 
bank intervention, to the entire world financial system. As a result, 
banks made concessions in their, negotiating positions and yielded to 
demands for lower spreads and fees on new and rescheduled loans. The 
creditor commercial banks, with the support of central banks approached 
debt reschedulings on a case-by case basis by which dealt with each 
country's reschedulings separately and have generally insisted that the 
debtor country should have in place an upper-credit tranche program 
with the IMF. Because banks did not simply rely on their confidence that
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repayments would be on time, and wrote into their loan agreement terms 
that protected them against failures by the member to pursue the 
program which the IMF was supporting with a stand-by arrangement. The 
terras might provide that if, for any reason, the member was unable to 
purchase exchange under the stand-by arrangement, the banlîs would not 
be bound to advance funds under their loan agreements.
Agreement on an IMF programme has become the basic requirement for 
the reschedulings of debts of IMF members. This agreement opens the 
door to both IMF financing and to the willingness of commercial banks to 
reschedule and provide new loans. If a country cannot agree the terms 
of an IMF programme or fails consistently to meet performance criteria, 
it prejudices its access to both further IMF money and, therefore, to 
commercial bank financing. As discussed previously, however, IMF money 
may also be contingent on both agreement to an adjustment programme as 
conditionality and on the willingness of commercial banks to provide new 
money.
IMF's Iiiltdatdve dn the Mexdco Case
As the central authority in the system and supporter for the 
balance of payments financing for its members, the IMF did not remain 
aloof from the debt-servicing problems of its members in the early 
1980s. Because it was advocated that "the international monetary and 
financial system as a whole were threatened, and not the indebted 
countries alone."5 2 The IMF would have been unable to satisfy the total
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needs of members from its own resources as it would have been able to 
borrow. In 1982 it seemed that Mexico might be firs t  case in which the 
threat to the system would become reality, because default by it would 
probably be followed as. a precedent by other heavily indebted countries.
In these circumstances, in late 1982, as Managing Director of the 
IMF of the time, Mr. Jacques de Larosiere took an initiative that changed 
the practice of the IMF and creditor banks. Mexico negotiated with the 
IMF for an ext.ended arrangement under which an amount equivalent to SDR 
.3.410.625 million would be available from January 1, 1983. Mexico's
Secretary of Finance and Public Credit and the Director General, of the 
Bank of Mexico attached to the arrangement a letter o f Intent dated 
September 10, 1982, setting forth the objectives and policies that the 
authorities o f Mexico intended to pursue during the period of the 
proposed extended arrangement.
Having received the letter of Intent from Mexican authorities, the 
IMF took the initiative of inviting the top executives of the bante as 
the advisory committee of the creditor banks to a meeting at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York on November 16, 1982. IMF's attitude 
was so different that it was in the position of "refere" at the meetings, 
or claimed so. It announced that if  the banks did not agree by December 
5, 1982 to contribute US $5 billion to finance Mexico's needs, the
extended arra^ement requested by Mexico would be declined. The IMF 
claimed at the meeting that a ll would benefit from the preservation of a 
sound financial system and so they had to collaborate to provide the 
resources needed to maintain such a system.
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This initiative of the IMF succeeded and the Mexican case became 
the precedent for a new practise of the IMF. Still in similar cases, the 
IMF awaits a commitment by banks to lend a specified amount of
resources and to restructure existing debt before the Executive Board 
of the IMF takes a final decision to approve a stand-by arrangement. 
For this, creditor banks establish advisory committees to negotiate the 
terms for new lending and restructuring of existing debt. The IMF 
communicates with the advisory committee in matters related to a 
member's negotiation with banks in which the IMF can play a "refere" role. 
The IMF's s ta ff  provides information to the advisory committee about the 
financial situation of the country on default, to which LDCs strongly
object. An official from the IMF reveals that: "the procedure became so 
standardized and welcome that lending by the banks in accordance with 
the procedures, which was at f irs t  called "involuntary" is now called
"concerted. "5 3
With this new role, it  can be claimed particularly by the IMF s ta ff  
that the IMF has acquired the reputation of a more flexible and a more 
dynamic organisation than in the. past. But its new role is also
controversial particularly in the debtor countries for some points:
i) Case-by-case approach advocated by the IMF and international 
monetary authorities, and preferred by banks is inconsistent with the 
rules. The rules, as quoted just above [53] are fairly general and 
in no way country-specific. They are claimed not to "take account 
of the social and economic relations in individual debtor countries 
or the impact o f  austerity programmes on the well-being of the
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private sector and on the operation of market mechanisms which are 
the sacred cows o f the IMF and US establishments."54
ii) Debtor countries, particularly those in Latin America, tend to the 
view that the debt problem is both general and structural, ie . the 
result of depressed export markets type initiatives that address 
those problems. But these countries, under the surveillance of the 
IMF were obliged to negotiate their debts and debt obligations, 
however, with hanks believing the debt problem to be "country-specif-
• ic" but on the contrary doing their business on the basis of 
non-specific, general rules.
iii) The external debt problem has become extremely political In this 
connection, the IMF's role was defined as being "debt ringmas­
ter... [which] is an inevitably political business" and it was also added 
that: "it may be too late for the IMF to retreat to its neutral role 
as a short-term provider o f finance."5 5
For these reasons, developing countries particularly those in Latin 
America object to this new policy of the Fund, that would authorize
closer relations, o f the IMF with commercial banks. Actually closer
!
relations might arise the suspicion that the IMF was favoringbanks 
over its members. For example, Brazil which is the Third World's biggest 
debtor tried to stand distant from the IMF for two years, accusing it of 
"being an evil meddler, thus snubbing commercial bankers' demands."56 
Because, the three-year programme signed with this country in January 
1983 was cancelled before its second year was over, for the reason that 
it was unable to meet the monetary and fiscal targets of the programme,
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even though a ll balance_of_ payments targets were consistently
fulfilled. 5 7
Similar claims are frequently made such as the following:
"Adierica's visible sway over policy [of rescheduling] reinforces the view that the Fund is terely the banks' agent in 
the debt talks, intent on squeezing the last cent out debtors.'56
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5.C0NCLDSI0NS
As examined in earlier sections of this study, the IMF has evolved 
to serve as a multi-lateral economic assistance to developing countries. 
But the major role the IMF was to supervise smooth working o f ’the world 
monetary and financial system.
The IMF's posture in its new role is well known; external 
disequilibria are always a consequence of excess aggregate domestic 
demand, caused by excessive credit expansion. Consequently, the IMF has
A
always proposed to cure such disequilibria by purging this excess demand 
as elaborated in its financial facilities. Thus, the IMF was commonly 
charged with insisting on austerity insensitive to the aspirations of 
developing countries. The recent Latin American experience disproved 
the Fund's opinion of strong connection between the balance_of_payments 
and domestic performance criteria. It is worth noting that what is 
important, in this regard is not the posture of the Fund, but the 
inconsistencies and policy failures which are eroding the Fund's 
credibility.
The three-year programme signed with Brazil in 1983 was cancelled by 
the IMF before its second year was over, for the reason that Brazil was 
unable to meet the monetary and fisca l targets of the programme, even 
though a ll balance_of_payments targets set by the IMF were consistently 
fulfilled. Mexico, on the other hand, met the fiscal targets of its 1983
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IMF program with a surplus of US $5,5 billion in the current account of 
its balance_of_payments, but however, a deficit of US $4 billion was 
anticipated according . to the programme.5 9 These two important cases 
showed that the achieving of the balance_of payments targets does not 
require targets of domestic performance criteria to be met, or
vice-versa. These cases confirm that Fund programs are likely to err in 
establishing strict domestic performance criteria than necessary to 
attain the balance_of_payments objectives of the programs.
Although the IMF is insisting on austerity in promoting its 
stabilisation programmes, countries that follow, the trade and investment 
policies of the Fund are in fact stimulated to consume more than they 
produce and need, with. the consequences of larger balance_of_payments 
deficits and growing foreign debts.6o in the early years of 1980s, one 
of the things that most worried the international financial community 
including the IMF was the drop in worldwide imports, particularly those 
of the developing deficit countries. Facing with the worldwide recession, 
the IMF had to press borrower countries to liberalise their foreign 
trade and increase their imports in lieu of devoting their financial 
surpluses to the repayment of their external debts, such as in Brazil·
"It [Brazil] was able to obtain trade surpluses, of over $10-12 billion, in 1985 and again in 1986. Horried that these 
monies might not be spent in an "adequate" may, the Fund sent a high level mission to Brazil in August 1984, to advise 
on the best course to follom. The recommendations of the Fund's mission mere "to b u m  dollars as quickly as possible 
and to restrict exports." Shortly after this visit, the Brazilian government adopted a package of measures designed to 
"bum" dollars; the import of over 2,300 superfluous items, (from toilet tissue to Micheal Jackson posters) mas allomed, 
and the amount of dollars that Brazilian tourists could take out of the country mas trembled."**
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Criticisms from the debtor countries have become more severe with 
the increase in their debts and the resulting economic and social stress. 
Some countries have declared open rebellion, as in the cases of Bolivia, 
Peru, and more recently, Brasil But the IMF representing the system 
and creditor countries is so powerful that no country can get external 
financial resources, unless a previous agreement with the Fund has been 
signed. So these countries too at the end had to come to face with the 
IMF. The Economist welcomed the return of Brazil to the IMF with the 
following statement: "Brazil learns a little humility."6 2
The IMF, in its evolution seemed to have dissociated from 
international macro-policy which should have been its "special preserve". 
The Economist claimed that IMF's monetary clout is diminishing, reporting 
the following:
“When the finance ministers of the Б5 [most potterful five "great“] countries announced a пен exchange-rate policy at 
New York's Plaza Hotel in September 1985, the IHF's managing director Jacques de Larosiere, mas not present. (The story 
goes that he first heard of the meeting from his press office; his staff saw it reported on a newsHire.““
The IMF has changed unintentionally over the past years. In the 
future, i t  may be recasted by force of circumstance in other roles for 
which it may be ill-suited. But restrictive roles and posture of the IMF 
would surely lead to faUures of lending programmes and thus discredit 
itse lf in the eyes of the International financial community. For this 
reason, the IMF must give up establishing stricter domestic performance 
criteria as part o f its conditionality more than necessary to restore  
the external balance o f the deficit countries.
page: 5 4
N O T K S
1. R.Dornbusch and S. Fischer, Macro-Economics (T4cGraw-Hlll, 1984), p.545.
2. F.L.R_Bati2  and L.R.JBatis, International Finance (New York McMillan 
P.C., 1985), p.520.
3. The ratio of gold in the total world reserves decreased from 70 to 
24% between the years 1950-73 whereas that of US dollar increased from 
28 to 67% in the same period. See Cevdet Erdost, IMF istikrar 
Politikalar! ve Türkiye (Ankara: Savaş Yayinlari, 1982), pp.58-9.
4. But even in the Bretton Woods conference (1944) a ll currencies were 
assumed to be "equal" to each other and alternative "key-currencies" 
approach was rejected.
5. For example, the SDR forms only 6% of the official holdings of 
reserve assets of a ll countries in 1986 (source: Annual Report o f IMF)
6. W.M. Scammell, The Stability o f the International Monetary System (New 
Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), p.13-17.
7. Ibid., p.18.
8. Batis (1985), p.l76.
9. J.Schatan, World Debt : Who Is to Pay (New York Zed Books Ltd., 1987), 
p.36.
10. Erdost (1982), p.55.
IL J.C.Pool and S. Stamos, The ABCs o f International Finance 
(Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1987), p.45.
page: 5 5
12. Ibid., p.50.
13. Scarnrael (1987), p.49.
14. Ibid., p.86, Erdost (1982), p.75.
15. IMF, Floating Exchange Rates in Revelopiijg Countries 
Experience with Auction and Interbanli Markets, May 1987.
16. Scammel (1987), p.l7.
17. Raymond F. Mikesel, "Appraising IMF Conditionality : Too Loose, Too 
Tight, Or Just Right?" Essay in IMF Conditionallty(1985) . p.47.
18. John Williamson, IMF Conditionality (Washington, D.C.: Institute fo r  
International Economics, 1983), p.608.
19. IMF 1976, p.88.
20. Brian Kettel and George Magnus The International Debt Game, 
Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1986, p.lOO.
21. Richard Goode, Economic Assistance to Developing Countries Through the 
IMF, The Barkings Institution, Washington, D.C.,1985, p.4.
22. International Monetary Fund, Annual ¡Report o f the Executive Board 
fo r  Financial Year Ended 30, 1979, pp. 136-38.
23. Richard E. Feinberg," The Changing Relationship between the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund", International Organization 
Volume 42 Number 3(Summer 1988), pp. 548-50.
24. IMF Survey, 26 September, 1988, p.292.
25. IMF Survey, 31 march 1986, p.l09.
26. Williamson (1983), p.665.
27. Goode (1985),p.ll.
/
28. Kettel and Magnus (1986), p.l02.
page: 5 6
29. Williamson (1983), p.608.
30. Ibid., p.616.
31. Goode (1985), p.l3.
32. Economist, September 26, 1987.
33. Ibid., p.20.
34. Economist September 24, 1988.
35. IMF, Selected Decisions o f the International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, D.C.:IMF, 1981, p.26.
36. Feinberg (1988), p.550.
37. Williamson (1983), p.50.
38. Ibid., p.50.
39. Goode (1985), p.23.
40. Feinberg (1985), p.555.
41. Pool and Stamos (1987), p.85.
42. IMF (1987), pp.39-45.
43. Ibid., pp.47-72.
44. Joseph Gold,"Mexico and the Development o f the Practice o f the 
International Monetary Fund," World Development VoL16, No.lO (October 
1988), pp.1127-1134.
45. Ibid., p.1130.
46. Schatan (1987), pp.8-10.
47. A country may run into debt-servicing difficulty fo r  a number 
reasons:
page: 5 7
i) it  may have pursued inadequate macroeconomic policies leading 
to balance o f payments problems undermining its ability to 
service debt;
ii) it  may have borrowed excessively, that is beyond its current 
capacity to service the debt;
iii) it  may have borrowed on unfavorable terms (fo r example, it  may 
have accumulated too much short-term debt or should have 
accepted high rates o f interest), or it  may have built up an 
unfavorable maturity profile, with a "hump" in repayments falling  
due;
iv) it  may be affected as in 1970s and 1980s adversely by events 
that it  cannot control such as variable interest rates applied by 
banks: by 1984 over a third o f to ta l non-oil developing countries 
debt was subject to variable interest rates, or finally;
v) it  may experience a temporary but substantial export
sh o rtfa ll due to unfavorable climatic conditions or developments 
(such as recession) in the world market fo r  the export
commodities. Kettel and Magnus (1986), p.l40.
48. Argentina, Turkey, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Ghana, Peru, India, 
Pakistan, Cambodia.
49. Pakistan, Chile, India, Ghana, Zaire, Sierra Leone, Turkey, Peru, 
Sudan, Togo.
50. Kettel and Magnus (1986), p.l53.
5L World Bank, World Debt Tables: External Debt o f Developing Countries, 
1984-85, pp. xi, xiii-xiv.
page: 5 8
52. Gold (1988), p.ll33.
53. Ibid., p.1134.
54. Kettel and Magnus (1986), p.l56.
55. Economist^  September 24, 1988.
56. Economist, June 20, 1987.
57. Edrnar L., Bacha,"IMF Conditionality: Conceptual Problems and Policy 
Alternatives," World Development, VoL. 15, No.12 (December 1987), p.l458.
58. Economist·, September 24, 1988.
59. Bacha (1987), p.l459.
60. See, fo r  example, Schatan (1987), p.5-40.
61. Ibid., p.37.
62. Economist, June 20, 1987.
63. Economist, September 24, 1988.
page: 5 9
R E K E R K N C E S
-Batİ2, F.L.R and Batis, L.R., International Finance(New York McMillan P.C., 
1985).
-Dornbusch, Rudiger and Fischer,S., Macro-Economics (International;
McGraw- Hill, 1984).
-Economist, June 20, 1987.
-Economist, September 26, 1987.
-Economist, September 2.4, 1988.
-Erdost, Cevdet, IMF istik rar Folitdkalarl ve Türkiye (Ankara: Savas
Yayinlari, 1982).
-Feinberg, Richard E.,“ The Changing Relationship between the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund", International Organisation Volume 42 
Number 3(Summer 1988).
-Goode, Richard, Economic Assistance to Developing Countries Through the 
IMF ( Washington, D.C.: The Barkings Institution, 1985).
-International Monetary Fund, Annual Deport o f  the Executive Board (for  
Financial Year Ended 30, 1979).
-IMF, Selected Decisions o f the International Monetary Fund ( Washington, 
D.C.: IMF, 1981).
-Kettel, Brian and Magnus, George, The International Debt Game (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1986).
-Mikes el, Raymond F., "Appraising IMF Conditionality : Too Loose, Too
page: 60
Tight, Or Just Right?" Essay in IMF Conditionality (1985).
-Pool, J.,C., and Stamos, 5., The ABCs o f International Finance, 
(Massachusetts : Lexington Books, 1987).
-Scammell, W., ]A.,The Stability o f the International Monetary System (New 
Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987).
-Schatan, J., World Debt : Who is  to Pay (New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 
1987).
-WiUiamson, John, IMF Conditionality (Washington, D.C.: Institute fo r  
International Economics, 1983).
page: 61
Vitae:
The author was born in 1959 in Ankara and got the degree of BSc in 
Civil Engineering in 1982 from the Middle East Technical University. 
A fter graduation, he worked at technical and managerial positions in the 
construction projects in the country and abroad. Performed his military 
service in the Turkish Air-Forces in 1984, and speaks English and French.
page: 62
